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Abstract 
<159:> Mihailo Marković (1923-2010) was one of the leading members of the 
Yugoslav Praxis Group. Among other topics, he worked on the theory of 
communication and dialectical meaning, which makes his approach relevant 
for a contemporary critical theory of communication. This paper asks: How did 
Mihailo Marković conceive of communication? Marković turned towards 
Serbian nationalism and became the Vice-President of the Serbian Socialist 
Party. Given that nationalism is a particular form of ideological 
communication, an ideological anti-praxis that communicates the principle of 
nationhood, a critical theory of communication also needs to engage with 
aspects of ideology and nationalism. This paper therefore also asks whether 
there is a nationalist potential in Marković’s theory in particular or even in 
Marxist humanism in general.  
For providing answers to these questions, the article revisits Yugoslav praxis 
philosophy, the concepts of praxis, communication, ideology and nationalism. 
It shows the importance of a full humanism and the pitfalls of truncated 
humanism in critical theory in general and the critical theory of communication 
in particular. Taking into account complete humanism, the paper introduces 
the concept of praxis communication.  
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The Praxis Group was a community of scholars in Yugoslavia. It was 
predominantly based at the University of Zagreb and the University of 
Belgrade. The founders included Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrga (both based in 
Zagreb) and Mihailo Marković (based in Belgrade). <160:> The Group edited 
the Praxis journal from 1964 until 1974. The international edition was 
published from 1965 until 1973. Between 1963 and 1974, the group also 
organised the annual Korčula Summer School. Having supported student 
protests in 1968, members of the group came under increased criticism and 
were expelled from the Communist Party (Bogdanović 2015). In 1975, eight of 
them (the Belgrade Eight) were suspended from their jobs at the University of 
Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy (ibid.). It became impossible to continue 
organising the journal and the summer school. In 1981, the group founded the 
journal Praxis International that existed until 1993.  
  
Mihailo Marković (1923-2010) was the Group’s internationally most active and 
visible member. This for example becomes evident when one looks at the 
biographies and bibliographies of group members published in the 1979 
volume Praxis: Yugoslav Essays in the Philosophy and Methodology of the 
Social Sciences (Marković and Petrović 1979, 389-398) that collected English 
translations of the Praxis journal’s key articles. The bibliographies indicate 
that Marković was the only member who had in 1979 published two 
monographs in English: From Affluence to Praxis (Marković 1974a) and The 
Contemporary Marx (Marković 1974b). The only other Praxis Group-
monographs that had at that time been published in English were Svetozar 
Stojanović’s (1973) Between Ideals and Reality: Critique of Socialism and its 
Future and Gajo Petrović’s (1967) Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century. 
Marković’s (1984) book Dialectical Theory of Meaning (first published in 
Serbo-Croatian in 1961) is explicitly dedicated to the analysis of the mental, 
symbolic, linguistic, communicative realm, which makes his work particularly 
interesting for engagement when one is interested in foundations of a critical 
theory of communication. This paper therefore asks: How did Mihailo 
Marković conceive of communication?  
 
Ideology is a particular type of communication. Marković became in the 1980s 
a spokesperson for Serbian nationalism. From 1990-1992, he was the Vice-
President of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party (SPS). So one can 
observe a peculiar contradiction of internationalism and nationalism. When 
dealing with communication in Marković’s works, we therefore have to 
inevitably also ask questions about ideology and nationalism. This paper 
proceeds by engaging with the concepts of praxis (section 2), communication 
(section 3), ideology (section 4), and nationalism (section 5). Section 6 draws 
general conclusions. 
 
<161:> 2. Praxis 
 
Marković (1974a, 63) discerns between three types of activity: work, alienated 
labour and praxis. Work is general production, whereas labour is an alienated 
form of work, in which humans do not control the conditions and results of 
their activities. In another work, he adds the term practice: Practice is “any 
Subject’s activity of changing and object” (Marković 1979, xxviii). Practice can 
be alienated. Praxis in contrast is “a specifically human activity” that is 
“characterized by self-determination, i.e., by a conscious purposeful 
commitment to practically realize one specific, freely chosen possibility among 
a set of alternatives” (Marković 1979, xxxi). Praxis is “free creative activity” 
that realizes “specific potential faculties and satisfies the needs of other 
human individuals” (xxviii). “Work becomes praxis only when it is freely 
chosen and provides an opportunity for individual self-expression and self-
fulfillment” (xxix). Praxis is “a free human activity with definite esthetic 
qualities, in which man objectifies all his potential powers, affirms himself as a 
personality, and satisfies the needs of another person” (1974a, 53). It 
“enriches the lives of others and indirectly becomes part of them” and shows 
“direct concern for another person’s needs” (65). Praxis “establishes valuable 
and warm links with other human beings” (65).  
 
Marković’s concept of praxis is not consistent. In Dialectical Theory of 
Meaning (Marković 1984), he uses praxis and practice synonymously, i.e. he 
does not give any political meaning to the praxis concept. “Praxis is 
subjective-objective” (xiv). Practice is “activity by means of which people 
transform their nature and social environment in order to improve their living 
conditions” (38), it is human subjects’ “purposeful creation of inorganic and 
organic objects and the social conditions of human life” (39). Praxis, or what 
he also calls practice or practical interaction, has for Marković two 
dimensions: the interaction with nature, i.e. the “utilization of natural resources 
for human purposes, growing production”, and social interaction, in which “we 
become aware of ‘other minds’” (xvi). It here already becomes evident that 
there is a certain dualism inherent in Marković’s approach that separates the 
physical and natural world from the mental and communicative world. Praxis 
is a uniting concept, but the two forms of praxis are left separate.  
 
Are there advantages of discerning between practice and praxis? In Marxist 
theory, the distinction goes back to Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: <162:> “#3 
[…] The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity 
or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as 
revolutionary praxis. […] #8 All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries 
which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and 
in the comprehension of this praxis” (Marx 1845, 3, 5)1. It becomes clear that 
Marx sees human life as practical in the sense that humans change the world 
in and through their practices. When he speaks of praxis, he means a 
particular form of practice, namely political practice that aims at creating a 
humane society, understands the needs of such a society, and deconstructs 
ideologies that mystify domination. For Gramsci (1971), the philosophy of 
praxis is critical because it criticises common sense (330). Praxis aims at 
“absolute humanism” (417). Both Marx and Gramsci show that praxis is the 
critical and political dimension of theory and human activity. By using praxis in 
parts of his works as synonymous with practice, Marković depoliticises social 
theory.  
 
In contrast to Marković, Gajo Petrović, who was another important member of 
the Praxis Group, argues in his book Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century for an 
axiological-political concept of praxis: “’Man is praxis means’ man in society, 
freedom, history and future” (23). “There is no praxis without freedom, and 
there is no free Being that is not praxis” (118). Praxis aims at a “free 
community of free personalities” (133). Praxis is the “authentic ‘mode’ of 
Being that reveals the true meaning of Being”, it is the “developed Essence of 
Being” (189).  
 
Most of Yugoslav praxis philosophy took the Marxian understanding of praxis 
serious and focused on the political goal of a self-managed society and 
economy. In Yugoslavia, Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin created foundations for 
such a form of democratic socialism. “Yugoslavia today is the only country in 
the world that is attempting to create and apply an integrated system of 
workers' self-management” (Supek 1975, 3). Workers’ self-management in 
                                            
1 In the English translation of the 3rd and 8th Feuerbach-theses, the term “practice” 
instead of the term “praxis” was used. I have in the quotation changed in all three 
Yugoslavia was “the first successful implementation of an integrated system 
of workers’ self-management” (Horvat 1975a, 36-37). The Praxis Group 
analysed <163:> Yugoslav self-management and showed its potentials, 
problems and limits. On the ethico-political level, human praxis demands self-
management. According to Rudi Supek (1971/1979, 253), self-management 
means that “man as the producer has the right to make decisions about the 
results of his work, that the state is not entitled to appropriate and dispose of 
the work surplus, that the right to manage an enterprise is shared by all 
workers and employees who work in it” (Supek 1971/1979, 253) 
 
Yugoslav self-management’s basic idea was that all workers formed a general 
assembly and elected a workers’ council that in turn elected a management 
committee: “All workers and employees of a firm constitute the work collective 
[radni kolektiv]. The collective elects a workers' council [radnički savet] by 
secret ballot. The council has 15 to 120 members elected originally for one 
year and recently for a two-year period. The council is a policy-making body 
and meets at intervals of one to two months. The council elects a managing 
board [upravni odbor] as its executive organ; the board has 3 to 11 members, 
three-quarters of whom must be production workers. The director is the chief 
executive and is an ex officio member of the managing board” (Horvat 1975b, 
165).  
 
The Praxis Group argues that self-management as a form of participatory 
democracy needs to be used at multiple levels of society. “Socialist self-
government should he constructed as an integral social system. This means, 
first, that it must embrace all parts of society, and second, that in addition to 
the sell government of individual elements, it must be seen as the self-
government of society as a whole. This assumes the governance of self-
governing elements into a complete self-governing society” (Stojanovič 1975, 
467). One of the Group’s criticisms was that Yugoslavia was not a self-
governing, self-managing society, but limited self-managing to the level of 
economic organisations: A “vivid dualism exists in practice – self-managing 
groups in the base and a rather strong statist structure above them” 
(Stojanovič 1975, 469). Another problem was that banks and trade 
organisations took on a monopolistic role that they used in order to control 
self-managed companies and “to illegally draw off profits from the producing 
organizations” (Supek 1971/1979, 258). There was also a “middle class 
liberalism” (257) that that tried to foster entrepreneurialism and that atomised 
society into competing individuals. The results were “uneven compensation 
for the same work” and that unions “were forbidden to fight for a uniform 
standard <164:> by which laborers were compensated” (259). The workers’ 
council elected the company-director from candidates nominated in public 
competition by a selection committee that to a majority consisted of 
representatives of the commune (Horvat 1975b, 166). Workers often 
considered the director as “a representative of ‘alien’ interests in the firm” 
(166).  
 
Yugoslav self-management certainly created its own contradictions that had to 
do with the contradictory relation between state power and workers’ power in 
transitional society, but it is clear that it was a very important attempt to foster 
democracy in the economy.  
 
Marxist humanism is based on Marx’s insight that in approaching a problem, 
humans need to “grasp the root of the matter. But for man the root is man 
himself”, “man is the highest being for man” (Marx 1844a, 182). So it is 
convinced that all humans deserve a good life and the good life for all is an 
important political goal worth struggling for. Therefore Marx formulated the 
“categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, 
enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (182). The Praxis Group was guided by 
Marx’s humanism and so assumed that “all relationships in which man is a 
humbled, oppressed, abandoned and despised being should be destroyed” 
(Vranicki 1972/1979, 234). For Stalin, humans and their practices, praxis and 
knowledge were in contrast mere reflections of the objective world (ibid.).  
 
The Praxis Group was an important representative of Marxist humanism. But 
what are the most important assumptions of Marxist and socialist humanism 
in general? Erich Fromm (1965) edited a collection on Socialist Humanism 
that presented 36 chapters written by Marxist humanist scholars. Taken 
together, the volume outlines Marxist humanism’s basic assumptions: 
 
Ontology: 
• Society is grounded in human practice and social production. 
• Only humans themselves can achieve a humane society by their practical 
self-activity in social struggles. Praxis is a key aspect of achieving a 
humane society.   
• Capitalism, class and domination constitute a form of human alienation that 
constitutes a difference between how social life is and how it could 
potentially be.  
Epistemology: 
• Marx’s early writings, especially the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, 
are important intellectual foundations of Marxist humanism. 
• <165:> There is no epistemological break in Marx’s works that led him 
away from humanism. Marx’s later works are guided by the general 
principles formulated in his early works. 
• Humanism requires an open form of theory, dialectic and praxis. 
Orthodoxies such as Stalinism turn socialism into a dogmatic, deterministic, 
mechanistic, reductionist and quasi-religious practice.  
Axiology: 
• Given society’s grounding in human praxis and social production, humans 
should be collectively in control of the conditions and results of human 
activity. 
• Democratic socialism is the society adequate to humans. It is not limited to 
politics, but the collective self-management of the economy and society. 
• Democratic socialism is the foundation for the full realisation of humans’ 
and society’s potentials.   
 
Based on the analysis of practice and praxis, we can next have a look at the 




Communication is for Marković besides sense development, reason, 
imagination, creativity, harmonisation of interests and aspirations, evaluative 
choice among alternative possibilities, and self-consciousness a fundamental 
human capacity (1974a, 13-14). Communication involves language and the 
“ability to understand the thoughts, feelings, desires, and motives of other 
persons from other social groups, nations, classes, races, religions, and 
cultures” (13). Language plays a key role in communication: Language “is an 
activity (energeia) which is a medium used by people to communicate and 
coordinate their praxis” (1984, 262), it is the “activity of speaking and writing, 
i.e. a system of operations with signs” (320). Language is one of the human 
means of communication that are used as means for the production of 
meanings and social relations. Raymond Williams (2005, 50-63) therefore 
speaks of means of communication as means of production.  
 
Marković in his analysis of communication again mixes up praxis and practice. 
Communication is certainly a human practice that in ethical and political action 
can turn into praxis communication. All praxis communication is 
communicative practice, but not all communicative practices are praxis 
communication. The problem of Habermas’ (1984) theory of communication is 
as in Marković’s terminology the mix-up of the ethico-political and the 
ontological level of <166:> communication (for a critique of Habermas, see 
Fuchs 2016, chapter 6). Communicative action for Habermas (1984, 285) 
aims at transcending “egocentric calculations of success”, but at “reaching 
understanding”. Communication is not naturally fair and does not naturally 
and automatically stand above or outside of structures of domination. 
Communication is the basic human practice of creating and reproducing 
social relations through symbol-use, which implies that it is used both in 
domination and emancipation from domination. That humans make meaning 
of each other in communication does not include and automatically imply that 
they understand and agree with each other. The transformation of 
communicative practices into praxis communication is a political task of social 
struggles that is not automatically given. Praxis communication is 
communication that acts within democratic-socialist structures or aims at 
establishing such structures and a society built on them.  
 
In Dialectical Theory of Meaning, Marković (1984, 39) defines communication 
as one of six forms or elements of practice. The others are work/material 
production, co-operation, experience, evaluation, and thought/intellectual 
activity. “Communication is that specific form of practice, which consist in 
operations with signs, by means of which people come to mutual 
understanding and stimulate one another to engage in a particular type of 
action” (39). This distinction’s problem is that it separates work and 
communication. Work is seen as material production and “purposeful creation” 
(39). The implication is that communication is neither material nor purposeful. 
But communication’s purpose is that humans make meaning of each other 
and the world. It is a purposeful activity. And in cultural and communicative 
work, which is a form of work that has become widespread, humans create 
use-values that offer opportunities for making meanings to others. Ferruccio 
Rossi-Landi (1983) and Raymond Williams (1977) therefore stress that 
communication and work should not be separated, but be seen as material 
practices (see Fuchs 2016, chapter 6).  
 
Objects 
Material objects Mental objects 






Table 1: Marković’s (1984, 72) typology of objects 
 
Marković (1984) draws a strict separation between the material and the 
mental world (see table 1). He sees the realm of the material as the world of 
physical objects that are either created by nature or by humans in society. 
Individual ideas or collective mental phenomena, “including common 
experiences, feelings, ideas, value judgements, interpretations of symbols, 
[…] ‘class consciousness’, […] public opinion” (70) are in <167:> contrast for 
him mental and “nonmaterial” (71). Matter “consists of all objects that exist in 
space and time” (70). Mental is a “synonym of ‘psychic’” (73). The problem of 
such an approach is that it draws a crude distinction between base and 
superstructure that renders the realm of culture and communication 
secondary and of minor importance. The problem is not just that one thereby 
cannot explain the importance of communicative and cultural work, but also 
that the result is a philosophical idealism that postulates two substances of 
the world (matter and mind) and cannot answer the question of how the world 
is at the foundational level grounded. Mental processes are not, as Marković 
argues, non-spatial and non-temporal: Individual ideas and values are stored 
in the human brain for a particular period of time (until an individual dies, 
forgets them or gives them up). And collective ideas have space-time 
because a particular community shares them during specific time periods. A 
community of humans has certain structures of feeling, it shares particular 
collective “meanings and values which are lived in works and relationships” 
(Williams 1961/2011, 337).  
 
Now you can ask: What about dreams, the characters in a novel, fantasies, 
ideologies, lies, myths, or the idea of God? Are these not ideas that do not 
have a material correlate and are therefore “immaterial”? No, like all ideas, 
these ideas are material because particular humans or groups of humans live 
and express them. But we can say that certain ideas are material, but not real. 
They are unreal. Any idea has a relation to an object. In the case discussed 
here, the object is imagined and does not exist in the world.  
 
For Hegel (1830), reality is being-there (Dasein), “being with a determinacy” 
that is immediate and is something with quality (§90). Reality is not just “inner 
and subjective”, but has “moved out into being-there” (addition to §90). So 
reality is an aspect of qualitative being (Sein). Reality that does not have a 
referent in reality external to the human is unreal being. For Hegel, actuality 
(Wirklichkeit) is the unity of essence and existence (§142). Actuality is 
reasonable being.   
 
<168:> A house that I build is real just like the thoughts I have about it. 
Thoughts about how a house I want to build should look like are unreal being 
that is however potential reality. A dream about a house built out of chocolate 
on the imaginary chocolate planet Chocolate Moon is material being, but it is 
unreal and impossible and therefore no potential reality. It is imaginary being. 
What are the implications of these distinctions for the notion of 
communication? Communication is a material and real process that creates 
and maintains social reality by offering in symbolic forms interpretations about 
real and unreal being, potential and imaginary being to other humans, who 
based on it produce particular meanings of the (real, unreal, potential, 
imaginary) world. Communicative practices turn into praxis communication 
when they are oriented not just on how society is or can be, but on how it can 
be made an actual society.  
 
A form of communication that invents imaginary existence and proclaims that 
the imaginary is actuality in order to defend and legitimate domination is 





Ideology is one of the most difficult concepts in cultural theory because there 
are multiple understandings and uses of it.  
 
Marković writes that ideology can on the one hand be understood as “any 
conceptualization of values, needs and interests, any theory about an 
accepted ideal, any choice of a general value orientation, any project of a 
future for which we are ready to engage, and consequently, a critical attitude 
toward existing social realities” (1974a, 53). He on the other hand contrasts 
this understanding with the definition of ideology as the expression and 
disguise of “particular group interests […] in the form of indicative statements, 
creating the impression that they refer to obvious facts, and thus demand 
acceptance as indubitable truths” (1974a, 54). In the book From Affluence to 
Praxis, Marković (1974a) says Marx’s theory is an ideology in the first sense 
and anti-ideological in the second sense, but he leaves open his own 
understanding of ideology. 
 
In the article Science and Ideology, Marković (1974b, 42-80) argues that both 
understandings of ideology can be found in Marx’s works: Marx and Engels in 
the German Ideology understand ideology as “inadequate, twisted, mystified” 
consciousness (44), whereas Marx in the Preface to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy speaks of the legal, political, philosophical, 
religious, aesthetic and philosophic realms as ideological forms that constitute 
“the superstructure of an historical epoch” (61). Marković <169:> clarifies that 
he prefers the general definition because the other one does not allow 
speaking of the “revolutionary ideology of the proletariat” (73). He therefore 
defines ideology as “the ensemble of ideas and theories with which a class 
expresses its interests, its aims and the norms of its activity” (74).  
 
Marković’s justification for the superiority of the general ideology concept is 
confused. The proletariat’s consciousness is neither automatically unitary nor 
progressive, as the contemporary tendency of blue-collar workers’ support for 
far-right parties shows. It is possible that we simply speak of a “revolutionary 
worldview”, which does not require the notion of ideology. Also not all 
revolutions are politically progressive, so there can be revolutionary 
worldviews that are ideological, in which case we can speak of a 
“revolutionary ideology”. The problem is that the general concept of ideology 
is ethically and politically relativist. If praxis is progressive social action, then 
situating the consciousness associated with it on the same level as fascist 
consciousness (“socialist ideology”, “fascist ideology”) denigrates the first and 
trivialises the second. One can now interpose that Stalinism is certainly an 
ideology in the negative sense of the term. The critical concept of ideology, 
however, allows us in such cases to argue that Stalinism is an ideology and 
opposed to socialist worldviews. General concepts of ideology, such as the 
ones by Marković, Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci or Karl Mannheim, 
“thoroughly purge from the ideology concept the remains of its accusatory 
meaning”2 (Horkheimer 1972, 28). 
 
Nationalism is a particular form of ideology, an ideological anti-praxis. We will 




According to Bogdanović (2015, 461), the Serbian part of the Praxis Group in 
the context of the breakdown of Yugoslavia “practically overnight turned 
coats” and “turned into nationalists and/or liberals”. Marković from the mid-
1980s onwards propagated Serbian nationalism. We will in this chapter 
analyse this development, which however requires that we first take a look at 
the context of the Yugoslav wars (5.1) and discuss left-wing positions on it 
(5.2) before we then more closely engage with Marković’s perspective (5.3). 
 
5.1. The Crisis and Break-Up of Yugoslavia  
 
After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia entered a phase of permanent 
economic and political crisis, featuring high unemployment, high inflation, high 
inequality, high <170:> national debt, strongly falling average income, etc. It 
started disintegrating. Yugoslavia had to take on IMF loans that brought along 
structural adjustment programmes. Over decades there had been an uneven 
development, in which Slovenia and Croatia developed and Kosovo, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were lagging behind. 
Economic problems are a frequent trigger and context of the rise of 
ideologies, including nationalism that invents scapegoats that are blamed for 
social problems. Nationalism and independence movements were on the rise 
in the 1980s and 1990s in all parts of Yugoslavia. According to the 
documentary film Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War, Germany armed Croatian 
separatists3. In 1990, Serbia limited the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.  
In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from 
Yugoslavia. War broke out between Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia. In late 
1991, the Serbs of Croatia proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina that 
                                            
2 Translation from German 
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u04IL4Od8Qo  
was not internationally recognised. Also Macedonia proclaimed 
independence. In 1992, the EU, the USA and the UN recognised Slovenia 
and Croatia, which further spurred nationalism in the Balkans. Especially 
Germany’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Austrian 
equivalent Alois Mock played important roles in recognising the two newly 
formed states. In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence and the 
Bosnian Serbs declared the independence of the Republika Srpska. The 
Bosnian war started. The USA, the EU and the UN recognised Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) that was not internationally recognised. In 1993, Croatia got 
involved in the war in Bosnia. Macedonia was internationally recognised in the 
same year. NATO bombed the Republika Srpska in August and September 
1995. In December 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY signed 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 1998, war broke out between the Kosovo 
Liberation Army and the FRY. From March until June 1999, NATO intervened 
militarily and bombed the FYR and Kosovo. The FYR forces withdrew from 
Kosovo. The NATO intervention in Kosovo set a precedent that was later 
repeated in the 2003 Western intervention in Iraq: It was a war without a UN 
Security Council decision that was undertaken although no NATO country had 
been attacked or threatened and that NATO justified on humanitarian grounds 
(Chandler 2000). 
 
5.2. The Left-Wing Discourse on the Yugoslav Wars 
 
There are at least two characteristic positions in the left-wing debate on the 
Yugoslav wars. Noam Chomsky represents the first position. He focuses in 
his analysis on NATO’s bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. Chomsky 
argues that the US chose to “escalate the violence” (2000, 44), which would 
have resulted in an escalation of <171:> Serbian attacks on Kosovo-Albanian 
civilians in Kosovo, hundred thousands of refugees fleeing the bombings in 
Kosovo, and in unpredictable long-term consequences. Chomsky says that in 
the situation of humanitarian crisis, it would always be possible to act 
according to the principle “First, do no harm” (2000, 48) and to do nothing if 
that elementary principle cannot be upheld. But the situation of having to do 
nothing would never arise because “[d]iplomacy and negotiations are never at 
an end” (2000, 48). The NATO bombings of the Balkans in 1999 are for 
Chomsky characteristic of international politics that do not rely on a universal 
framework such as the UN Charter or the International Court of Justice, but 
are based on the principle that the “powerful do as they wish” (Chomsky 1999, 
154). Whereas the US would tolerate the ethnic cleansing of Kurds in Turkey, 
it would intervene into ethnic cleansings in Kosovo. “Serbia is one of those 
disorderly miscreants that impede the institution of the U.S.-dominated global 
system, while Turkey is a loyal client state that contributes substantially to this 
project” (1999, 13).  
 
Herman and Peterson (2007) in a detailed analysis whose content is 
comparable to the one by Chomsky argue that internal and external factors 
played a role in the breakdown of Yugoslavia and that the external factors 
have often been denied. These factors would include finding a justification for 
NATO’s existence after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the global assertion of the 
“Washington consensus”, the role of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia, and liberals and leftists’ support of Western 
military intervention. Herman and Peterson also argue that the wars and 
bombings in the Balkans stimulated al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism 
and resulted in a massive wave of displacement and refugees.  
 
Slavoj Žižek (1999) is a representative of the second position. He argues that 
Yugoslavia did not disintegrate when Slovenia declared independence, but 
already when Miloševič deprived “Kosovo and Vojvodina of their limited 
autonomy” (40) so that Yugoslavia was already dead and could only l have 
lived on under Serbian domination. Žižek’s assessment is comparable to 
Chomsky in respect to the critique of NATO’s selective interventions in the 
name of the defence of human rights based on its “strategic interests” (41) 
and the “the end of any serious role of [the] UN and [the] Security Council” 
(50) in international relations. However, Žižek much more than Chomsky also 
focuses his critique on Serbian nationalism, arguing that the NATO 
interventions and the Milošević-regime are not opposites, but symptoms of the 
New World Order that should be <172:> opposed (44). “When the West fights 
Milošević, it is NOT fighting its enemy […]; it is rather fighting its own creature, 
a monster that grew as result of the compromises and inconsistencies of the 
Western politics itself” (46) that over years mistook Milošević as a factor of 
stability in the region, not seeing his “anti-Albanian nationalist agenda” (49). 
“The way to fight the capitalist New World Order is not by supporting local 
proto-Fascist resistances to it, but to focus on the only serious question today: 
how to build TRANSNATIONAL political movements and institutions strong 
enough to seriously constrain the unlimited rule of […] capital, and to render 
visible and politically relevant the fact that the local fundamentalist resistances 
against the New World Order, from Milošević to Le Pen and the extreme Right 
in Europe, are part of it?” (50).  
 
Jürgen Habermas (1999) took a comparable position, arguing that NATO 
acted without a UN Security Council mandate, that “[n]ationalistic dreams of a 
Greater Albania […] are not the slightest bit superior to the nationalistic 
fantasies of a Greater Serbia which the intervention is supposed to contain” 
(266). He also stresses that NATO intervenes in the case of the Kosovo, but 
not in favour “of the Kurds, Chechians, or Tibetians” (269), which shows the 
selectivity of the politics of military intervention. Habermas concludes that the 
only adequate answer in such situations is to establish “a global democratic 
legal order” based on “UN institutions” (270) and “strengthened diplomatic 
efforts” (271).  
 
The analytical difference between the first and the second left-wing position 
on the Yugoslav wars is that the first is based on an analysis of empirical facts 
and data, whereas the second on uses political-theoretical reasoning. They 
reflect a certain difference between Anglo-Saxon empiricism and European 
continental philosophy. The political difference is that the first position takes 
an anti-imperialist position that opposes US interventions and seems to have 
some sympathies with Serbia, whereas the second rejects the logic “the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend” and argues that there should be no 
sympathies with any side because they are all barbaric and classical anti-
imperialism is mistaken here.    
 
Given that war always involves psychological war waged via the media and in 
public, it is always difficult to trust any sources that report on the causes and 
consequences of war. Often there are very different stories about the extent 
and perpetrators of war crimes. So it is best that one encounters reports about 
war with scepticism and critically and compares different sources. In respect 
to the war in Bosnia, there were several investigations. Human Rights Watch 
(1992, 5) found that “all <173:> sides have committed serious abuses, 
Helsinki Watch found that the most egregious and overwhelming number of 
violations of the rules of war have been committed by Serbian forces” (Human 
Rights Watch 1992, 5). A United Nations expert commission concluded that 
“[a]ll of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have 
committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions” (UN Security Council 
1994, §127). The International Committee of the Red Cross (1999, v) 
reported: “The war enveloped all the communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A 
third of both Serbs and Bosniacs (31 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively) 
say a close family member was killed. The Serbs report the highest incidence 
of being forced to leave their homes (54 per cent).  A near majority (45 per 
cent) of Croats lost contact with a close relative; more than a third (36 per 
cent) were forced to leave home; and 18 per cent report the death of a close 
family member. The Bosniac community experienced the highest level of 
injuries related directly to the war: 18 per cent of the total Bosniac population 
were wounded in the fighting, 10 per cent were imprisoned, 7 per cent were 
tortured and 5 per cent know somebody who was raped. In each instance, the 
percentage was two or three times that for the other communities”.   
 
No matter to which extent one trusts these sources or not, they taken together 
suggest that in the Yugoslav wars, all sides committed war crimes. 
Nationalism was a driving force on the Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Bosnian, 
Kosovo-Albanian, Macedonian and Montenegrin sides. The Yugoslav war 
reminds us first and foremost of the violent dangers of any form of 
nationalism.  
 
Given this context, we can now turn to the discussion of Marković and Serbian 
Nationalism.  
 
5.3. Mihailo Marković and Nationalism 
 
Marković co-authored the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts (SANU Memorandum) that was published in 1986 and that according 
to observers incited Serbian nationalism (Magaš 1993, 4, 123, 199-200; 
Naimark 2002, 149). Marković was from 1990-1992 the Vice-President of 
Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party’s (SPS). In 1995, Milošević 
dismissed Markovic from the SPS’s executive committee (Djukic and 
Dubinsky 2001, 86).  
 
<174:> The SANU Memorandum argues that, in the 1960s, Yugoslav self-
management was “pushed into a backseat” and remained limited to the micro-
economic realm of the enterprise, lacking an expression at the macro-
economic and political realms. “Consequently, self-management is mere 
window dressing and not the pillar of society” (Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts 1995, 103). “Sovereignty of the people” and “[s]elf-determination of 
nations” (117) would (besides human rights and efficiency) have to be part of 
the solution of Yugoslavia’s crisis. Yugoslavia would have unevenly 
developed national autonomies at the expense of the Serbs, who would suffer 
from “persecution and expulsion […] from Kosovo” (118) and political 
discrimination. Because of discrimination, Serbia would also have an 
underdeveloped economy (120). The Memorandum speaks of the “physical, 
political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and 
Metohija” (128) via the “Albanianization of Kosovo” (128). Serbs would also 
have been suppressed in other parts of Yugoslavia. “Prominent Serbian 
writers are the only ones featuring on the black lists of all the Yugoslav mass 
media” (135). “The establishment of the Serbian people’s complete national 
and cultural integrity, regardless of which republic or province they might be 
living in, is their historical and democratic right” (138) 
 
Also in 1986, Marković and other Praxis intellectuals such as Ljubomir Tadić 
and Zagorka Golubović signed a petition that argued that there was a 
continuous Albanian takeover of Kosovo and that called for the abolition of the 
autonomy of Kosovo (Magaš 1993, 4, 51, 52). It spoke of the need for the 
“defence of the foundations of Serb national culture” and the right “to the 
physical survival of our nation on its land” (51). Golubović, Marković and Tadić 
wrote in 1987, “In Kosovo the pursuit of a project of an ethnically pure Kosovo 
has resulted in a flat refusal of any policy of family planning. […] In 1940 there 
were 55 per cent Albanians in Kosovo, in 1985 it is already 80 per cent […] 
something can be done and must be done about the forceful assimilation and 
expulsion of the non-Albanian population from Kosovo” (59-60). 
 
In a New York Times-report, Markovič argued in 1992 that the EU’s 
recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as states, which was led by 
Germany, led to war. The “United States and European countries suddenly 
decided to recognize Bosnia without any guarantees for the Serbian or 
Croatian community. That made war inevitable. […] We Serbs don't 
understand why our three traditional allies – Britain, France and the United 
States – don't recognize that Germany is returning to its old role, this time 
using economic and political means rather than military invasion” (Kinzer 
1992). <175:> "The alternative is creation of a Muslim state in the heart of 
Europe. Perhaps the Americans want to support this in order to be doing 
something for the Muslims, hoping they could exercise influence here through 
their Turkish allies. […] But we find this very disturbing […] and we don't like 
the idea that Turkey, which invaded our land and ruled us for 400 years, 
would consider this territory as part of the Muslim world" (Kinzer 1992) 
 
Markovič in such statements completely forgets his Marxist roots. Strong 
population growth has social causes. Kosovo was in the late-1980s 
Yugoslavia’s poorest region, with an income of only 27 percent of the 
Yugoslavian average (Herman and Peterson 2007, 4). In 1993, Marković 
contributed a chapter to a book on the democracy-theorist C. B. 
Macpherson’s intellectual legacy. The editor Joseph Carens had, given 
Marković’s role in Milošević’s SPS, doubts about including the chapter and 
prefaced it with a cautionary note, to which Marković responded. Marković 
argued that there was widespread media manipulation in reports about 
Serbia’s role in the war and that “Serbia has not committed any aggression 
against its neighbors” (1993, 240).  
 
So it is evident that at least between 1986 and 1993, Markovič, a key figure of 
Yugoslav democratic and Marxist humanism, resorted argued for Serbian 
nationalism. Mira Bogdanović, who studied Markovič’s (2015, 464) intellectual 
and political life, argues that his turn towards nationalism is for her 
“inconceivable”. How can one explain such an intellectual development from 
Marxist humanism towards nationalism? Was it a radical rupture and break? 
Or was there an element in Markovićs’ interpretation of humanist Marxism that 
was prone to nationalism? According to Magaš (1993), the Praxis editors’ 
alignment with Serb nationalism “delineates a complete break with the political 
and philosophical tradition represented by the journal” (52). So her argument 
is that Marković betrayed Marxist humanism. Keith Doubt (2006) takes a 
different position and in contrast argues that “there is something in Marković’s 
writing that allows us not to be surprised by his ignoble conduct supporting 
and planning Milošević’s genocidal campaign of terror throughout former-
Yugoslavia” (45-46). Doubt says that Marković’s identified six aspects of 
praxis: Intentionality, freedom as self-determination, creativity, sociality, 
rationality, and individual self-realization. These dimensions would for 
Marković be independent and detachable. 
 
“In Marković’s reasoning, one’s practice can exemplify intentionality but 
not creativity, sociality but not rationality, individual self-realization but 
not freedom as self-realization. […] Unless the six optimal dispositions 
that constitute Marković’s concept of praxis are seen as coinciding within 
a whole, ‘a higher order of normative <176:> principle’, it is difficult to 
see how Marković’s notion of what good practice is is anything except 
chaos. Marković’s understanding of praxis is nihilistic. Marković’s 
theorizing within the tradition of critical theory foreshadows, indeed 
predicts, his bad faith with which he cynically supported and promoted 
evil in Bosnia. […] Although Marković is not a philosopher of Heidegger’s 
stature, the issues that Marković and Heidegger’s biographies raise are 
comparable. […] The argument here is the opposite: it is the deficiency 
of metaphysical thinking in Marković’s work that explains his ignoble 
promotion of genocide in Bosnia” (Doubt 2006, 49-50).   
 
In order to analyse whether there is a nationalist potential in Marković’s 
theoretical thought, we need to have a deeper look at his works. One can in 
his writings find anti-nationalist proclamations, as is typical for Marxist-
humanist thought. Marković (1974a) for examples argues that “nationalism 
and racialism” are “disintegrative and regressive processes” (Marković 1974a, 
79). Explaining the causes of nationalism, Marković (1974b, 90) argues that 
“scarcity, weakness, lack of freedom, social and national insecurity, a feeling 
of inferiority, emptiness and poverty […] give rise to  […] nationalism and 
class hatred, egoism, escape from responsibility, aggressive and destructive 
behaviour, etc.”. Fascism is distinct from capitalism and socialism in that “the 
nation or the race” is “the aim of politics” (1974a, 147). Fascism “tries to 
mobilize all social classes for the promotion of national and racial interests” 
(1974a, 152). Fascists aim at “grabbing the possessions of other nations and 
races” (1974a, 156).  
 
The latter quote is on the one hand critical of racism and nationalism, but 
seems to assume that different human races exist. We saw in section 3 that 
Marković sees language as a way of how social groups, “including nations, 
classes, races” (1974a, 13) communicate. In this general definition, Marković 
assumes that different human races exist. The assumption that nations exist 
is ambivalent because the term is often used either as actually existing nation-
states or as ideological construct that proclaims the existence of a community 
based on biological or cultural ties.  
 
Markovićs was always critical of Marx’s concept of essence. He says Marx 
“smuggled values into ‘essences’” (Marković 1993, 242). For Marx, 
“selfishness, greed, envy, and aggressiveness” are not part of human 
essence, but of alienation (Markovićs 1974a, 218). The twentieth’s century 
was “an age of incredible eruptions of human irrationality and bestiality. The 
scope and character of bloodshed and mass madness […] can no longer be 
explained by the romantic, dualistic picture of a latent positive essence and a 
transient bad appearance. Evil as a human disposition must lie very deep. 
Obviously it is also a latent pattern of human behaviour, which is the produce 
of the whole previous history of the human race, always ready to unroll as 
soon as favorable conditions arise” (Markovićs 1974a, 219). 
 
<177:> Markovićs (1974b, 156-157) argues that Machiavelli’s Prince sees 
humans as inherently egoistic, whereas Marx’s Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts advance “an over-optimistic utopian conception of man as 
essentially free, peace-loving social, creative being” (156). Both would have a 
“reified conception of human nature” (158). “Human nature is constituted by 
contradictory latent predispositions” (1974b, 151). Human history would show 
the existence of such essential contradictions, for example “a striving for inter-
group and international collaboration and solidarity but also class, national, 
and racial egoism” (159). 
 
The question arises whether there is a contradiction between human essence 
and human existence in class society or whether a fundamental contradiction 
between solidarity and egoism forms human essence. The problem is that the 
transferal of nationalism and racism onto the level of human nature (although 
in a contradictory manner) does not allow us to provide an ethical grounding 
of the argument that nationalism and racism and all other forms of domination 
are harmful. The consequence is a certain naturalisation of domination.  
 
We know from studies in development psychology that in the “9 month 
revolution”, babies because of the recognition and care they receive start 
perceiving attachment figures whose perspectives they take over, which 
contributes to their social development (Tomasello 2008). Care for others is 
absolutely essential for human development. In contrast, violence towards 
babies harms their development. This example shows that care, co-operation, 
solidarity, altruism and recognition are more fundamental than neglect, 
competition, separation, egoism and hatred. Society and human development 
are not possible without the first, but without the second.  
 
The theoretical implication is, as Marx (1844b, 299) says in the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts, that the “individual is the social being” and that 
structures of domination harm the development of humans and society. 
Marković in contrast wants to make his readers believe that the social and the 
anti-social are two equally essential features of humans. It is surprising that 
Marković rejects the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts’ notion of the 
human, but operates within the theoretical and political universe of Marxist 
humanism. It is not an understatement to say that the Manuscripts are one of 
Marxist humanism’s foundational texts. As a consequence, Marković’s 
approach does provide an adequate foundation for the critique of ideologies 
such as nationalism and racism. 
 
Marković not only assumed that nations and races have a real existence, but 
also that they have a right to self-determination and state-formation. This 
becomes for example evident in the SANU Memorandum’s demand for the 
“[s]elf-determination of <178:> nations” (Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts 1995, 117), or when the 1986 petition that Marković signed talks about 
the “defence of the foundations of Serb national culture” (Magaš 1993, 51), or 
when Marković (1989, 408) writes that in Kosovo, “[t]wo nations [Serbs and 
Albanians] claim the same territory” (Marković 1989, 408). Such assumptions 
naturalise and essentialise the existence of nations. They disregard the basic 
insights of Marxist critiques of nationalism. Rosa Luxemburg (1976) applied 
Marx’s fetishism critique to the nation and nationalism. She argues that 
nationalism and the assumption that biologically, historically or culturally 
determined nations exist ignore “completely the fundamental theory of modern 
socialism – the theory of social classes” (135). “In a class society, ‘the nation’ 
as a homogeneous socio-political entity does not exist” (136).  
 
Marxist critiques of nationalism commonly assume that nation-states are the 
results of wars, domination, violence and political conflict and that the nation 
is an invented, ideological, fabricated and illusionary product (Balibar and 
Wallerstein 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Özkirimli 2010). Nationalism 
is an ideology that veils the class and dominative character of society. That I 
speak the same language, hold the same passport, live in the same region or 
nation-state, am ruled by the same elites as others does not constitute a real 
bond that defines a particular group as superior to another. National bonds 
are illusionary, unreal, imaginary, ideological bonds that always constitute an 
outside and a potential for violent defence of the imaginary border between 
the inside and the outside of the nation. A worker has much less common 
interests with the owner of the company that employs him than he has with 
the worker in a distant country, who works in the local branch of the same 
company or in the same industry. 
 
Humans are different. When humans live together or next to each other, one 
needs to take into account both their diversity (different ways of life) and what 
unites (basic human needs). Living together will fail when either diversity or 
unity are fetishised. Such fetishisms can lead to the eruption of violence and 
sectarianism. Living together requires human unity in diversity, a dialectic of 
the common and plurality. Unity in diversity requires also that the basic needs 
of all can be fulfilled. It is therefore not compatible with the principle of class.  
 
There is also a nationalist potential in Marković’s (1975) peculiar interpretation 
of self-management. He argues that self-management means self-
determination (329). A <179:> subject creates new conditions in order to 
achieve “self-realization, […] the actualization of basic human capacities, […] 
the satisfaction of genuine human needs” (330). Self-management requires a 
federation of councils made up of representatives from different economic 
levels, critical information sources, and a “powerful, democratic public opinion” 
based on free expression, open communication, and dialogue (331) “The 
fourth condition of self-determination is the discovery of the true self of the 
community, the development of consciousness about real general needs of 
the people” (331). The individual, nation and class would need “a full sense of 
self-identity” (331). 
 
The theoretical problem of what the “self” in self-management is becomes in 
Marković’s interpretation a question of nationality. For Marxist humanism, the 
self is the community of humanity that produces society in common and 
whose interest as a common humanity is therefore undermined by divisions 
such as class, nation and racism that play off one group against another. 
Rosa Luxemburg (1970, 391) warned that nationalism resulted in the First 
World War, in which “working men kill[ed] and destroy[ed] each other”. The 
right to national self-determination was for Luxemburg (1976) a “metaphysical 
cliché” (110). There would only be a right of the working class to self-
determination (108).  
 
The right of the working class to self-determination is a universal demand for 
humanity without the class principle, the demand for a classless society 
without domination. Marx’s argument that humans are social beings that 
should jointly control of the products of their common production implies a 
universal moral right to democratic socialism. Although humans have different 
individual realities, preferences and choices, they all share the status of being 
human and as such deserving a good life. Marković’s assumption that there is 
a right to national self-determination is based on the acceptance of the 
ideological constructs of nations and nationality, which undermines 
humanism’s universality. Marković can only make such an assumption 
because the principle of division, including national division, is for him part of 
human essence.  
 
Praxis International in 1989 published Marković’s (1989) paper Tragedy of 
National Conflicts in “Real Socialism”. The Case of Kosovo. It says that “race, 
blood or biology” (409) have nothing to do with the conflict between Kosovo-
Albanians and Serbs and argues that the conflict has national, political, socio-
economic, religious and ideological causes. Marković’s formulation that “[t]wo 
nations claim the same territory – one, Albania, on ethnic grounds, the other, 
Serbian on historical and cultural ones” (408) <180:> implies, however, that 
nations are not ideological constructs resulting from class and political 
conflicts, but are unitary historical, cultural and “ethnical” realities. Such an 
assumption reifies nations. Whereas he criticises Albanian nationalism that 
aims to establish Greater Albania, he rather lauds Milošević for having “invited 
people everywhere to an ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolution” directed against the 
discrimination of Serbs and focused on “Serbia’s having state functions on its 
entire territory as did other republics” (411). Marković complains that the 
“Kosovo has the highest birth rate in Europe” (414) and calls for population 
policies directed at Kosovo-Albanians in order “to prevent overcrowding of 
Kosovo” (424). Here Marković is actually, other than initially indicated, 
resorting to biological logic, indicating the view that procreation is a political 
threat to Serbs.  
 
Seyla Benhabib was co-editor of Praxis International from 1986 until 1992. 
She says that Marković at the time of the publication of the above-mentioned 
paper had become a “theorist of the ‘great Serbia’ dream” (Benhabib 1995, 
676). She argues that the article is “racist-nationalist propaganda” (676). It 
“exhibits the tragic mixture of forward-looking social engineering (use of 
monetary incentives to control birth rates) with paternalistic racism (if the 
Moslem Albanians do not stop reproducing at this rate, they will never be able 
to advance themselves economically)” (680, footnote 1). “Many of us felt that 
the wool was being pulled over our eyes by our colleagues in former 
Yugoslavia in what they were or were not publishing in the pages of the 
journal” (675). This development contributed to Praxis International’s 
termination.  
 
For Marković, selfishness, greed, envy, and aggressiveness are part of 
human essence. He thereby downplays the role of solidarity as essential 
feature of humans and society, which opens up a potential for the reification of 
nationalism in his theoretical approach. It is therefore theoretically consequent 
that Marković uncritically accepts the demand for the right to self-
determination of a “nation” that is based on the reification of nations. The 
foundational problem of Marković’s approach is that he rejects Marx’s concept 
of the human in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, which makes his 
approach prone to theoretical nationalism. There are therefore certain 





Marković has an ambivalent use of the praxis concept and tends to 
depoliticise it by using it synonymously with the notion of practice.  
He sees the realm of <181:> communication and ideas as immaterial and 
standing outside of material production, which results in an idealist and dualist 
approach. His unclear distinction between practice and praxis lacks an ethico-
political dimension and therefore fails in being able to discern between the 
ontological concept of communicative practice and the ethico-political notion 
of praxis communication. Both Habermas and Marković collapse 
communication’s ontology and axiology into one and thereby limit 
communication theory’s critical potential. Whereas Habermas interprets the 
ontological as axiological (“All communication is morally good”),  
Marković reduces axiology to ontology (“The concept of communication praxis 
is ontological”). Marković propagates a general notion of ideology that is 
purely analytical and robs it of its potential as intellectual weapon of critique.  
 
Marković rejects Marx’s insight that there is a positive social essence of 
humans. Marx’s assumption has however been confirmed by contemporary 
development psychology. As a theoretical consequence, Marković introduces 
division and separation into the concept of human essence, which poses a 
potential for theoretical and political nationalism. The divisionary and dualist 
character of Marković’s approach also manifests itself in his theory of 
meaning and communication that separates the material realm from the 
mental realm. 
 
There is a latent nationalist potential in Marković’s theory that derives from his 
ambivalent equalisation of the concepts of practice and praxis, his general 
concept of ideology that depoliticises critical theory, and the filling of this 
depoliticised vacuum by the political assumption that diversion, separation, 
egoism, selfishness, nationalism, greed and envy are just like sociality, co-
operation, altruism and solidarity part of human essence. Development 
psychology has shown that such an assumption is mistaken. The dualist 
concept of essence is, however, not just mistaken, but also politically 
dangerous because it opens up a divisive potential in social theory that can 
undermine humanism’s universality. The problem of Marković’s theoretical 
approach is that it is not humanist enough. It is a truncated form of humanism 
that at the political level turned into anti-universalism, anti-humanism and 
nationalism.  
 
The analysis in this paper does however under no circumstances imply that 
Marxist humanism has in general a latent nationalist potential. To the contrary, 
the positive, universal concept of the human is an intellectual defence against 
nationalism. Truncated humanism is no humanism at all because it is anti-
universalist and makes division and separation part of human essence. Rudi 
Supek (1971/1979), who was another key member of the Praxis Group, points 
out the democratic character of Marxist humanism’s universalism. He stresses 
that humanism is opposed to “ethno-centrism, every stressing of one’s own 
social group or nation at someone else’s cost” (270). Nationalists “are not 
capable of solving the problem of equality among peoples” (270). Equality 
would only be achievable “from an international standpoint, from the 
standpoint of <182:> a huge communion of peoples from whom should be 
expelled every ethno-centrism, international hatred and prejudice” (270).  
 
The part of the Praxis Group that advocated a complete humanism as it can 
be found in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts has left a positive 
and constructive legacy for a contemporary critical theory communication. 
Gajo Petrović (1967, 42-43) summarises the humanism the can be found in 
the Manuscripts: “A fundamental idea of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts is that man is a free creative being of praxis who in the 
contemporary world is alienated from his human essence, but that the radical 
form man’s self-alienation assumes in the contemporary society creates real 
conditions for a struggle against self-alienation, for realizing socialism as a de-
alienated, free community of free men” (42-43) 
 
The ethico-political concept of praxis allows us to discern between 
communicative practice and praxis communication and to thereby situate 
communication as praxis communication in the context of the struggle for a 
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